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0　Introduction
Lakoff  and Johnson (1980) proposes a number of  conceptual metaphors 
to show that “metaphor is pervasive in everyday language and thought” 
(p. ix). In this paper we will show that those conceptual metaphors proposed 
by Lakoff  and Johnson also apply to some legal concepts like justice, law, 
rights, and trials by referring to Wierzbicka (2006) in the first section and 
Winter (1988, 1989a, 1989b) in the remaining four sections. We will first 
discuss the notion of  justice, and then go on to show how such conceptual 
metaphors as SOURCE-PATH-GOAL and RATIONAL ARGUMENT IS 
WAR are crucially involved in such legal concepts as justice, law, rights, and 
trials.
1　Justice and other related words
Justice is a very important notion, but it is diffi cult to defi ne. For example, 
while it is defi ned as “each getting what he or she is due” in The Cambridge 
Dictionary of  Philosophy (Audi 1999, 456) (quoted in Wierzbicka 2006, 156), it 
is also associated with fairness and several other notions.
While “ ‘justice’ belongs to a common European heritage with its source 
in Greek philosophy and in the Bible” (Wierzbicka 2006, 156), Wierzbicka’s 
illustration of  some changes the English word justice has undergone since 
Shakespeare’s time gives us a revealing insight into the concept of  justice. 
In the following examples some people lower in rank in a society ask other 
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people higher in rank to give them justice, and the latter make decisions to 
redress the wrong doing, so that “each gets what he or she is due” as in:
(1) I beg for justice, which thou, prince, must give: Romeo slew Tybalt, 
Romeo must not live. (Romeo and Juliet) (p. 156)
(2) Antipholous of  Ephesus: Justice, most gracious duke, oh, grant me 
justice! ... 
Duke: Discover how, and thou shalt find me just. (Comedy of  Errors) 
(p. 159)
The usage of  words like justice in modern times, however, is in sharp contrast 
with the way they are used in Shakespeare’s plays. Reference to individuals 
like rulers (prince and duke in examples (1) and (2) above) has been largely 
replaced by reference to abstractions like “the system” and “the society” on 
the one hand, and “the law” on the other. The former two include examples 
like “the injustice of  the system” and “justice and injustice in their society,” 
and the latter “miscarriage of  justice” and the following:
(3) He says the pilots must face justice. (p. 159)
(4) But of  course, with capital punishment, justice delayed is always justice 
denied. (p. 159)
Law is not a person, but it has power over other people in that it can pass 
judgments on them through judges representing it.
The concept of  justice becomes clearer by comparing it with that of  
fairness. Justice, which can be described as being imposed from above through 
the enforcement of  law, is in contrast with fairness, which implies doing 
things together according to a set of  rules as does fair play. Such a difference 
in meaning is reflected in the compatibility/incompatibility of  the words 
laws and rules with the adjectives (un)just and (un)fair : laws can co-occur with 
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(un)just, but not with (un)fair, and it is the other way around with rules (cf. pp. 
145―146).
Apart from “the system,” “the society,” and “the law,” however, the 
word (un)just can be used with (un)fair, as in:
(5) They make conditions unfair and unjust. (p. 159)
(6) ... the Hayden-Cartwright Act agreed that using motor vehicle taxes for 
something other than building or maintaining highways was “unfair and 
unjust.” (p. 159)
For that matter, note also the compatibility of  the word just with right, as in:
(7) ... a new elaboration of  “law”―the development of  an understanding 
of  what is right and just in the violent contexts that the group will 
encounter. (Cover 1983, 49)
The word fair can also be used with reasonable, as in:
(8) The second requirement is that the judge should be seen to be even 
handed, fair and reasonable. (Wierzbicka 2006, 144)
The importance of  reasonableness is also refl ected in such legal concepts as 
beyond reasonable doubt (cf. Wierzbicka 2006, 117―123), as we read in Powell 
(1993, 22):
(9) In English law the prosecution must prove the guilt of  a criminal “beyond 
reasonable doubt.”
Reasonableness is also an important concept in civil action, as we shall see 
when we discuss such legal matters as law and rights. These examples show 
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that the words just, fair, right, and reasonable are closely associated with each 
other.1
2　Justice
In terms of  metaphors, Lakoff ’s (1966) Moral Accounting metaphor fi rst 
comes to mind. In this metaphor,
justice is the settling of  accounts, which results in the balancing of  the 
moral books. Justice is done when people get what they “deserve,” when 
moral debits and credits cancel each other out. (p. 56)
To quote from Johnson’s (1987, 90),2
Justice itself  is conceived as the regaining of  a proper balance that has been 
upset by an unlawful action.
(10) He committed murder and was sentenced to {death/life imprisonment}.
(11) 彼は殺人罪を犯し，｛死刑 / 終身刑｝の判決を受けた。
(＝(10) in Japanese)
Balancing the moral books or accounts or regaining a proper balance by 
serving a sentence for a crime is the metaphor of  justice involved here. This 
is also true of  such English expressions as ‘pay one’s debt (to society)’ and 
‘pay one’s dues (to society)’ (informal) in the sense of  canceling out what 
one owes to society, as in:
(12) The judge said that Mr. Simpson had to pay his debt to society.
(Spears 1996, 277)
(13)  I’ve paid my dues
Time after time
I’ve done my sentence
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But committed no crime
And bad mistakes
I’ve made a few
I’ve had my share of  sand
Kicked in my face
But I’ve come through
But we must go on, on, on, on
... (Someya, et al., 107)
The Western imagery of  the Goddess Justitia3 has justice symbolized not 
only by the scales of  justice, but also by the sword of  justice, and this part 
of  justice is enforced by law. To illustrate the role played by law in modern 
society, let us take the phrase law and order, “a situation in which people 
respect the law, and crime is controlled by the police, the prison system etc.” 
(LAAD, 808). An example is given below from the same page.
(14) The new government is gradually restoring law and order.
Law and order is in contrast with crime and disorder (OCD, 177). In terms 
of  metaphors, crime is conceptualized as MOTION and law as A 
CONSTRAINT ON MOTION:4
(15) [W]hen criminals are on the loose, we want them locked up. (Winter 
1989a, 1144, n. 124)
Since less crime is good, we try to reduce it by controlling it. We expect that 
we can reduce the crime rate by strengthening legal control. Metaphorically 
speaking, when the level of  control is up (CONTROL IS UP), the crime 
rate is expected to fall (BEING CONTROLED IS DOWN), and conversely 
when the level of  control is down, the crime rate is expected to rise (cf. 
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Winter 1989a, 1144, n. 124).
3　Law
In this section we will show how law is metaphorically conceptualized 
(cf. Winter 1989a, 1208―1211). One aspect of  law, as metaphorically 
represented, is LAW IS AN OBJECT. In the following examples, laws are 
objectified as something we can make/break, just like we can make/break 
concrete objects like a box.
(16) He was arrested for breaking the law.
(17) 彼は法律を破り逮捕された。(＝(16) in Japanese)
(18) It is Parliament that makes laws.
(19) 法律を作るのは議会である。(＝(18) in Japanese)
Similarly, just as we can take things (e.g., apples) in our hands, we can take the 
law into our own hands, as in:
(20) When police failed to arrest the suspect, local people took the law into 
their own hands and beat him up. (OCD, 452)
Another aspect of  law, as metaphorically represented, is LAW IS A 
PERSON. Just as judges can lay down rules, laws can lay down rules:
(21) We should follow the rules that the law lays down.
(22) 法律の定める規則に従うべきである。(＝(21) in Japanese)
Since we perceive law “as ‘faithful’ to us and thus deserving of  obedience”
(Winter 1989a, 1208), we obey the law, just as children obey their parents:
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(23) You should obey the laws of  your country.
(24) 自国の法律に従うべきである。(＝(23) in Japanese)
In English law is perceived as having a long arm, whose job is to enforce 
legal control:
(25) In the end the criminal could not escape the long arm of  the law.5
Though not quite the same, Japanese has similar expressions for police 
investigation:  {keisatsu/sōsa} no te（{ 警察 / 捜査 } の手）‘the arm of  {the 
police/the investigation}’ as in:
(26) ついにゼネコンに警察の手が回った。
‘In the end the long arm of  the police extended to the general 
contractor.’
(27) ついにゼネコンに捜査の手が伸びた。
‘In the end the long arm of  the investigation extended to the general 
contractor.’
Note also that in such Japanese expressions as hō-no-ami（法の網）‘the net 
(meshes) of  the law,’ law is perceived as {spreading/casting} its net to catch 
a criminal on the loose, just as we {spread/cast} our net to catch fi sh:
(28) ついに犯人は法の網に引っかかった。
‘In the end the criminal fell into the {meshes/clutches/grip} of  the 
law.’
(29) 犯人は法の網をかいくぐって逃走中である。
‘The criminal cunningly {evaded/eluded/escaped} the {meshes/
clutches/grip} of  the law, and he is still at large.’
Metaphorical Conceptualization of  Some Legal Concepts― 172 ―
Similarly police dragnet and its Japanese equivalent sōsa-mō（捜査網）can be 
used in such examples as (28) and (29) above and the following:
(30) The police have widened their dragnet in their search for the killer. 
(CIDE, 418)
(31) 警察は殺人犯の捜査網を広げている。(＝(30) in Japanese)
4　Rights
Rights, defined as “something that you are morally or legally allowed to 
do or have” (MED, 1222), implies moral or legal control and obligation. 
According to Winter (1989a, 1214), the term right derives from the word 
“right” (originally from the Latin rectus or straight) and
[i]ts systematic relationship to the concept of  LAW dates at least to the Bible 
and is related to the Life is a Journey metaphor. ... The concept of  right is un-
derstood in terms of  the notion of  following the correct path in life. So too, 
the notion of  legal rights is understood in terms of  the legally defi ned behav-
iors or paths marked out by the law.6
LIFE IS A JOURNEY is a metaphor in which LIFE is structured in terms 
of  A JOURNEY, for which the source-path-goal schema is used, as in:
SOURCE ― PATH ― GOAL
where SOURCE, PATH, and GOAL correspond to the traveler’s starting 
point, the {way/road} he/she is on, and his/her destination, respectively. 
The concept of  right and the notion of  legal rights thus conceptualized tell us 
that rights are what we acquire when we follow the path guided by God, as 
in (32) below, and the paths prescribed by laws, as in (33) below:
(32) You should have no trouble with the police if  you stick to the straight 
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and narrow. (Spears 1996, 341)
(33) You should have no trouble with the police if  you follow the rules laid 
down by the law.
Similarly, in example (34) below, the preposition to shows that a fair trial is a 
goal for the defendant and that a right is metaphorically perceived as a path to 
the goal, as is the path to the bridge in He followed the path to the bridge.
(34)  A defendant has a right to a fair trial. (Cf. Winter 1989a, 1217)
(35) 被告には公正な裁判を受ける権利がある。(＝(34) in Japanese)
These examples and those two given below ((36) and (37)) also show 
that rights are metaphorically conceptualized as possessions (RIGHTS ARE 
POSSESSIONS)(cf. Winter 1989a, 1220―1221).




As for legal rights, which are backed up by State power, and therefore 
contain an element of  violence (cf. Winter 1989a, 1213), they are also 
partly conceptualized in terms of  the RATIONAL ARGUMENT IS WAR 
metaphor (cf. p. 1220). Rights are established by society “in order to protect 
particular interests through the medium of  laws” (Winter 1988, 1480). Rights, 
however, have both positive and negative aspects.7  When we socialize with 
other people, we use positive rights and when we try to prevent interference 
from other people, we use negative rights. Since negative rights overshadow 
positive rights in our social lives, they are more often used to protect 
our interests during a conflict, and so is the language of  rights. Note the 
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similarities between the language of  rights and that of  war. Just as we fi ght to 
defend our country in war, we fi ght to defend ourselves in rational argument, 
and just as we fi ght to defend our rights, we fi ght to defend our interests, as in:
(38) We are fi ghting to defend our interests.
(39) 我々は我々の利益を守るために戦っている。(＝(38) in Japanese)
5　Trials
For a metaphorical conceptualization of  the trial, let us take the civil trial8 in 
the American legal system. In a civil trial or a trial involving private rights, 
we have a plaintiff  and a defendant as well as the judge, the jury, and the 
lawyers speaking for plaintiffs and defendants. The plaintiff  must have 
standing (to sue) “[t]he right or capacity to initiate a suit (AHDb, 1753)” or 
metaphorically speaking, he must be “standing” before the trial starts (cf. 
Winter 1988, 1388).9  The defendant {stands trial/goes to trial/is put on 
trial/is brought to trial}, while the plaintiff  takes a legal action against the 
defendant to get compensation for his/her injury. An injury is “a failure to 
respect your legal rights or property” (cf. MED, 738).
(40) Local residents (the plaintiff) {brought or fi led or raised an action/took 
legal action/fi led or started a lawsuit} against the chemical plant (the 
defendant) for water pollution.
(41) a. 地元住民（原告）は化学工場（被告）を水質汚染で提訴した。
b. 地元住民（原告）は化学工場（被告）を相手取り，水質汚染の訴訟
を起こした。(both (a) and (b)＝(40) in Japanese)
According to Winter (1988), we can metaphorically conceptualize a civil 
trial in terms of  the two metaphors based on the source-path-goal schema:10
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a causal source-path-goal metaphor and a remedial source-path-goal metaphor.
We identify the subject matter of  a lawsuit through the elements of  the 
causal schema. The defendant’s act is the source, the causal chain is the path, 
and the plaintiff ’s injury is the goal. The remedial source-path-goal metaphor 
is virtually a mirror image of  the causal one: The individual’s injury is the 
source of  a process that has as its goal an order from the court redressing that 
injury; the path that connects them is the plaintiff ’s proof  that the acts of  
the defendant caused the injury. (p. 1388)
To take example (40) (and similarly with (41)), the chemical plant’s causing 
the water pollution is the source of  the causal source-path-goal metaphor, 
whereas local residents’ injury is the source of  the remedial source-path-goal 
metaphor.
While the defendant is on trial, he/she is in the course of  a trial. When 
the defendant is brought to justice, he/she is to follow the course of  justice. 
While the plaintiff  has to prove that the defendant’s actions caused his/her 
injury, the defendant puts up a defense. Furthermore,
(42) The trial is conducted with due process of  law.
“Due process” is defi ned as “the correct process that should be followed 
in law and is designed to protect someone’s legal rights” (LDCE, 486). 
Similarly in Japanese,
(43) 裁判はしかるべき手続きを踏んで行われる。(＝(42) in Japanese)
When “there is an actual interference with the course of  justice, there is 
a departure from due process of  law” (Winter 1989a, 1218). Deliberately 
preventing a fair trial, including contempt of  law, is against the law:
(44) He was {accused of/charged with} perverting the course of  justice.
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There are also cases in which mistakes are made in the course of  justice 
(miscarriages of  justice). It would be a miscarriage of  justice or an injustice 
if  an innocent person is found guilty or a person to be punished escapes 
justice. Injustice is defi ned as “failure to treat someone fairly and to respect 
their rights” (MED, 738).
Note that law, which implements justice, and due process of  law involve 
the notion of  rights, as does justice, which administrates law. Note also that 
both injustice and injury refer to violation of  a person’s rights (cf. AHDa, 
677). In terms of  rights, then, when the plaintiff  is trying to redress his/her 
injury, he/she is trying to restore his/her rights. The defendant, on the other 
hand, is trying to defend his/her rights (cf. example (46) below), and it is as if  
he/she were trying to hold his/her ground in the course of  justice, as we see in 
example (45):
(45) The defendant is standing his/her ground.
(46) The defendant is standing his/her rights.
The following quotations, which illustrate how we use our rights, also 
give more evidence for metaphorically conceptualizing “rights as the proper 
procedural path that we identify with ‘the course of  justice’ ” (Winter 1989a, 
1218).
If  someone violates or obstructs my rights, I may take that person to court and 
invoke my legal rights to correct the legal wrong and to obtain from the judge 
an order directing the defendant to respect my rights or otherwise redressing 
my grievance. (p. 1217)
Thus, for example, a defendant has a right to a trial by jury. He or she may 
waive that right, as if  to pass up the procedural path offered by the law. In-
deed, the defendant may choose to forgo [forego] the right to trial altogether 
and accept its outcome in advance. (p. 1217)
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Lawyers representing their clients also play a crucial role. They give 
evidence to persuade the judge and the jury, and the judge, weighting all 
the evidence, makes a fi nal decision which he/she judges the best for both 
parties. In the actual trial process, however, lawyers representing their clients 
try to win the best decision for their own party at all costs. They even abuse 
the legal process, using unfair tactics.11  To use Tannen’s (1999) words, 
“litigation is war” or to use Winter’s (1988), “litigation is combat” and 
litigators are adversaries. Whether LITIGATION IS WAR or COMBAT, 
this metaphor derives from the RATIONAL ARGUMENT IS WAR 
metaphor.12  Thus words which refer to war are also used in litigation, as in:
(47) They fi ght it out in court. (Winter 1988, 1498)
(48) 法廷で戦い抜く。(＝(47) in Japanese)
(49) a. The {plaintiff/defendant} won the case.
b. The court ruled in favor of  the {plaintiff/defendant}.
c. The case was decided in favor of  the {plaintiff/defendant}.
(50)｛原告／被告｝が勝訴した。((49)＝ in Japanese)
We can settle cases before the trial or without going through a course of  
justice to avoid lengthy and costly litigation:
(51) The plaintiff  and defendant {came to/reached} an out-of-court 
settlement.
(52) 原告と被告で示談が成立した。(＝(51) in Japanese)
In Japan the court even advises both parties to compromise, as in:
(53) 裁判所は両者に和解を勧告した。
‘The court advised both parties to compromise.’
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Though we have such phrases as hōtei-tōso（法廷闘争）‘court battle’ and 
hōtei-senjutsu（法廷戦術）‘legal tactics,’ the practice of  law in Japan is not 
as adversarial as in America. Furthermore, we tend to refrain “from formal 
and open methods of  solving disputes” (Powell 1993, 18),13  making out-
of-court settlements (such as those illustrated in (51) and (52) above) far 
more common in Japan than in America. It also helps to show clear signs of  
repentance in court in Japan, though it counts for nothing in America (cf. 
McLean 1989, 2―3). Thus, if  we apologize sincerely for our crime in court, 
we may get our sentence reduced in Japan.
To give further evidence to show that we sometimes think and act 
differently from Westerners in making decisions, let us take what we call 
kenka-ryōseibai（喧嘩両成敗）‘It takes two to make a quarrel’ or itami-wake（痛
み分け）‘a mutually painful compromise.’  When both parties are in dispute 
or in conflict, a third party works out a compromise which they think is 
fair, but by which both parties are punished without any justifi able reason. 
Westerners would never make nor abide by such rulings which are not based 
on reasonable grounds (cf. Matsumoto & De Monte 2005, 102―103). Such 
rulings are not made in court even in Japan, but are a part of  our daily lives 
in our culture..
6　Conclusion
First we have shown how the words justice and just relate to such words as 
fair, right, and reasonable by referring to Wierzbick (2006, ch. 3). Then we 
went on to show how some conceptual metaphors proposed by Lakoff  and 
Johnson (1980) and Lakoff  (1966, 56) apply to such legal concepts as justice, 
law, rights, and trials by referring to Winter (1988) and (1989a). Conceptual 
metaphors relating to such legal concepts include LAW IS A PERSON, 
LITIGATION IS WAR (derived from RATIONAL ARGUMENT IS 
WAR), and the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL metaphor, among others. In terms 
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of  the LAW IS A PERSON metaphor, law is personifi ed as having a long 
arm to enforce legal control, for instance. The SOURCE-PATH-GOAL 
metaphor, both causal and remedial, adequately accounts for a defendant’s 
and a plaintiff ’s position in the course of  justice, and the PATH metaphor the 
concept of  rights as proceeding along the path. The LITIGATION IS WAR 
metaphor adequately accounts for lawyers fi ghting to win the best case for 
their clients.
Notes
I would like to thank William Naoki Kumai for his valuable comments on an earlier ver-
sion of  this paper. The errors are, as always, my own.
1  According to Wierzbicka, “the gradual shift from just to fair,” which “can be seen as 
parallel to the shifts from good to right and also from wise (and also true) to reasonable 
(p. 165), refl ects the shift from “abstract” to “procedural” morality, that is, from 
morality based on “a pure distinction between GOOD and BAD unsupported by 
any appeal to reason, procedures, methods, or intersubjectively available evidence” 
to morality which takes “a more rational, more procedural, more reason-based ap-
proach to human life” (p. 72).
2  As for “legal/moral balance,” note also the following quotations:
The institutions of  civil and criminal justice are founded upon a basic notion 
of  balance, as symbolized quaintly by the scale of  justice. As we would expect, 
legal arguments adopt all of  the standard features of  rational argument in gen-
eral. The lawyers want the jury to lean in their favor, so they employ a confusing 
mass of  facts, encourage weighty testimony, pile one argument upon another, add 
the force of  acknowledged authorities, and summon the weight of  the legal tradi-
tion. (p. 90)
The following quotation shows that “legal/moral balance” is similar to “the balance of  
rational argument”:
When I set out to convince others of  my view, I pile up evidence, amass facts, and 
build up a weighty argument. Ideally, anyone who listens to my argument will weigh 
its merits. Two arguments may carry equal weight, so we then try to tip the scale in 
favor of  our view by adding further evidence. If  we are successful, we feel the 
balance tip in our favor, as we add to our argument. (p. 89)
3  Cf. Winter (1989a, 1212), where we read: “the Goddess Justitia, the familiar image 
of  the blind-folded woman who holds aloft the scales of  justice in her left hand, 
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also carries a sword in her right.”
4  Cf. Winter (1989a, 1144, n. 124 & 1216). According to Winter, LAW IS A CON-
STRAINT ON MOTION is an entailment of  ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS, which 
in turn is an entailment of  LIFE IS A JOURNEY (p. 1216, n. 389).
5  Winter (1989a, 1212) identifi es ‘the long arm of  the law’ with its right arm:
If  LAW is to have a body it will have as well a right arm with which to enforce 
its commands. The long arm of  the law has been identifi ed: It is the right arm 
which enforces that which is acceptable and that which is not; it is the LAW’s 
sanction (that is, the potential sanction of  physical violence) that determines 
what is right. Might makes right.
6  Cf. also the following quotation from (Lakoff  & Turner 1989, 10):
The life-as-a-journey metaphor is so taken for granted in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition that we instantly understand that God is a guide, that there are alterna-
tive paths of  good and evil through life, and that death hangs over us through-
out.
One of  our major ways of  conceiving of  ethical behavior is an elaboration 
of  the life-as-a-journey metaphor: there are paths of  righteousness and evil 
ways. Laws are viewed as prescribing paths through life to be followed.
7  Cf. Tushnet (1984, 1392), where we read:
The distinction between negative and positive rights reflects and perhaps is 
based on a fundamental aspect of  our social life. We fear that others with 
whom we live will act so as to crush our individuality, and thus we demand 
negative rights. But we also know that we need other people to create the con-
ditions under which we can fl ourish as social beings, and thus we need positive 
rights. In our culture, the fear of  being crushed by others so dominates the de-
sire for sociality that our body of  rights consists largely of  negative ones.
8  According to Winter (1988), the private rights model is more prototypical of  adju-
dication, as we read:
... adjudication is a radial concept. All of  its submodels share the core source-
path-goal schemata of  arguments and purposes. The casual and remedial source-
path-goal metaphors of  the private rights model and the part-whole and link 
metaphors of  the public rights models radiate from this core. The private rights 
model seems, therefore, to be more central to the concept of  adjudication―a 
coherence prototype effect. Thus, the remedial source-path-goal metaphor of  the 
private rights model is seen as the primary case, or prototype, of  adjudication. 
In comparison, the public rights model doesn’t quite seem to fi t; it seems “of  a 
peculiar and eccentrical nature.” (p. 1412)
For the part-whole and link metaphors of  the public rights model, note the following:
One link was the informer’s information about the injury to the actual victim. 
The other link was provided by the part-whole schema: One part could speak for 
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the other since each was a constituent of  one whole. (p. 1409)
9  Note the following quotations from Winter (1988):
... the term “standing” is a metaphor. Its origin no doubt comes from the physi-
cal practices of  the courtroom: A court will only hear a participant if  he or she 
is standing. “Standing” is therefore a natural metaphor for when a court will 
consider a litigant’s claim; the metaphor is motivated by our experience. (p. 1383)
A court will only consider what a party has to say if  he or she is standing (read: 
has “standing”). (p. 1388)
10 Note also the following metaphor proposed by Winter (1989b, 2232):
ADJUDICATION IS MOVEMENT ALONG A PATH―Litigation is a judi-
cial “proceeding”; the plaintiff  must “carry the burden” of  proof; a presump-
tion may “shift” the burden of  “going forward”; the parties cite supporting 
“grounds” for their “motions”; alternatively, parties may decide to “forgo” their 
procedural rights.
11 For problems caused by the American adversary system of  law, cf. Tannen (1999, 
138―172). About some good points other systems have, Tannen says:
In the German and French systems, fact gathering is controlled by a judge, not 
by attorneys. The judge does most of  the questioning of  witnesses, and the 
judge’s goal is to determine what happened, as nearly as possible. Such a system 
surely has its own liabilities, but it provides an illuminating contrast to the goal 
of  attorneys in the adversary system: to manipulate facts to the advantage of  
their side. (p. 139)
12 Cf. Winter (1988, 1410), where he quotes the following from Lakoff  & Johnson 
(1980, 63) and says that “[t]his same set of  conceptualizations governs in legal mat-
ters” (1410―1411).
There is still a position to be established and defended, you can win or lose, you 
have an opponent whose position you attack and try to destroy and whose ar-
gument you try to shoot down. If  you are completely successful, you can wipe 
him out.
13 Cf. also McLean (1989, 2―3) & (1998, 86―87) for some differences between “Japa-
nese-style justice” and “American-style justice.”
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